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Rivers, and the bodies of water they flow into, constitute the
most important regional source of fresh water in the world. 
Asymmetric dependence on water resources has been at the
heart of several conflicts between upstream and downstream
water users. Global institutions, such as the United Nations,
have tried to reduce the number of these conflicts by promoting 
(the study of) multilateral agreements between water users.
In this dissertation we present recent developments in the
modeling of river water allocation problems by combining
principles from international watercourse law with methods
from (cooperative) game theory. More specifically, we focus
on the problem of distributing the welfare that results from
optimally allocating the water that flows in a river among the 
agents (e.g., countries, cities, firms) located along the river.
We extend a single-stream river water allocation model from the 
literature to situations in which the river is allowed to have several 
tributaries (and distributaries). In addition, we allow the countries 
in an international river water allocation model to be composed
of different water users. Finally, we also analyze the difference
between the rival and non-rival use of river water by introducing
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